Latest news with #political landscape
Yahoo
a day ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
What polls show about a very confusing political landscape
The political landscape right now is more confusing than a corn maze. For every data point that suggests Republicans face headwinds, there seems to be another that suggests Democrats should hold their britches. It all leaves this political analyst wondering just what the heck is going on out there, to paraphrase the great Vince Lombardi. Trump's popularity Let's start with President Donald Trump's approval rating. Gallup released a poll last week putting Trump's approval rating (37%), way down from the beginning of his second term (47%). The poll made a lot of press. Then you have the Wall Street Journal survey, which got a lot less play and showed something very different. Trump's net approval ratings among registered voters (approval - disapproval), while still negative at -6 percentage points, have barely declined from earlier this year. His approval rating of 46% looks a lot like it did at the start of the year. There are even surveys that have Trump's approval rating basically equal to his disapproval rating. Diving deeper into the data can leave one more befuddled, even when looking at the averages. Trump's approval rating with independents is lower than any president at this point in office. Yet he's lost very little ground with Republicans since the beginning of the year. This is important because there are a lot of them (e.g. see the section below this one). The average overall, regardless of how you compute the average, still does have Trump's net approval negative. That's where I think it is. Yet, I can't guarantee it. We've seen too many times in the last decade that the range of the results gave us a better understanding of the potential outcomes than the average did at pinpointing where things would end up. Party identification Pollsters will almost always ask how people identify themselves: Democrat, Republican or independent. Then they'll follow that up by asking independents whether they lean toward the Democratic or Republican side of the aisle. Party identification is one of the fundamental variables to understand how people will vote. Most Democrats will vote for Democratic candidates, while most Republicans will vote for Republican candidates. No wonder a lot of people took note of the Pew Research Center's annual benchmark poll that was released last week that showed 46% of the country were Republican or leaned Republican to 45% who were Democratic or leaned Democratic. That margin is no different from last year's version of the poll, before Trump won the presidency again. Pew's data, however, isn't the only data. I asked Quinnipiac University for their polls conducted during roughly the same period. Quinnipiac shows a pretty clear swing to the Democrats over the course of the year. During the January-to-February period, Republicans (including leaners) held a 1- to 3-point advantage on party affiliation. Democrats, however, were ahead by 2 to 4 points in the April and June polls. This included two 4-point edges in both June surveys they put into the field. I don't know who is right. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Democrats may be slightly ahead, though that's not great on a metric where they have usually been ahead over the years. The generic congressional ballot This question is one of my favorites. It asks respondents some form of 'would you vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate from your district?' The polling does seem to have the Democrats up. The Journal has them up narrowly among registered voters by 3 points. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from June finds the parties about evenly matched, with Democrats at 40% to Republicans' 38%. This is well behind the pace of where Democrats were in either 2005 or 2017 — the years before they won wave elections in the midterms. The Democratic lead in those cycles was closer to 7 points. Confused? You haven't seen anything yet. Ipsos' poll actually looks no different from their final poll on the subject in 2024, the year Republicans held on to the House. The Journal poll, which is one of Trump's better ones, shows the Democrats gaining significantly from its final survey in 2024, when Republicans were up by 4 points. But the seat-by-seat landscape in the House isn't the most appealing for Democrats. Both the Cook Political Report and Inside Elections show more potential pickup opportunities for the Republicans than Democrats. This is without any pro-Republican redistricting that might occur in Texas — or potential pro-Democratic redistricting in other states as retaliation for whatever Texas does. Democrats had more pickup chances than Republicans by this point in both 2005 and especially 2017, according to Cook. I should point out, however, that Democrats don't need a wave to take back the House. They need a small gain given the GOP's razor-thin majority. But with a smaller-than-usual lead on the generic ballot for Democrats and potential redistricting, that may not happen. The bottom line All of this leaves me a little befuddled. I believe Trump is more unpopular than not. Given that fact, I believe Republicans are in clear trouble for 2026. I'd probably have said the same thing during the 2022 cycle, when Joe Biden's approval rating was awful heading into those midterms. And while Democrats lost the House that fall, Republicans barely pulled it off. This cycle strikes me as even more confusing. And who can forget the most important variable? It's still 2025. It was only months before the 2022 midterms that Roe v. Wade got overturned and gave Democrats a political shot in the arm. We have a long way to go.
Yahoo
a day ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
What polls show about a very confusing political landscape
The political landscape right now is more confusing than a corn maze. For every data point that suggests Republicans face headwinds, there seems to be another that suggests Democrats should hold their britches. It all leaves this political analyst wondering just what the heck is going on out there, to paraphrase the great Vince Lombardi. Trump's popularity Let's start with President Donald Trump's approval rating. Gallup released a poll last week putting Trump's approval rating (37%), way down from the beginning of his second term (47%). The poll made a lot of press. Then you have the Wall Street Journal survey, which got a lot less play and showed something very different. Trump's net approval ratings among registered voters (approval - disapproval), while still negative at -6 percentage points, have barely declined from earlier this year. His approval rating of 46% looks a lot like it did at the start of the year. There are even surveys that have Trump's approval rating basically equal to his disapproval rating. Diving deeper into the data can leave one more befuddled, even when looking at the averages. Trump's approval rating with independents is lower than any president at this point in office. Yet he's lost very little ground with Republicans since the beginning of the year. This is important because there are a lot of them (e.g. see the section below this one). The average overall, regardless of how you compute the average, still does have Trump's net approval negative. That's where I think it is. Yet, I can't guarantee it. We've seen too many times in the last decade that the range of the results gave us a better understanding of the potential outcomes than the average did at pinpointing where things would end up. Party identification Pollsters will almost always ask how people identify themselves: Democrat, Republican or independent. Then they'll follow that up by asking independents whether they lean toward the Democratic or Republican side of the aisle. Party identification is one of the fundamental variables to understand how people will vote. Most Democrats will vote for Democratic candidates, while most Republicans will vote for Republican candidates. No wonder a lot of people took note of the Pew Research Center's annual benchmark poll that was released last week that showed 46% of the country were Republican or leaned Republican to 45% who were Democratic or leaned Democratic. That margin is no different from last year's version of the poll, before Trump won the presidency again. Pew's data, however, isn't the only data. I asked Quinnipiac University for their polls conducted during roughly the same period. Quinnipiac shows a pretty clear swing to the Democrats over the course of the year. During the January-to-February period, Republicans (including leaners) held a 1- to 3-point advantage on party affiliation. Democrats, however, were ahead by 2 to 4 points in the April and June polls. This included two 4-point edges in both June surveys they put into the field. I don't know who is right. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Democrats may be slightly ahead, though that's not great on a metric where they have usually been ahead over the years. The generic congressional ballot This question is one of my favorites. It asks respondents some form of 'would you vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate from your district?' The polling does seem to have the Democrats up. The Journal has them up narrowly among registered voters by 3 points. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from June finds the parties about evenly matched, with Democrats at 40% to Republicans' 38%. This is well behind the pace of where Democrats were in either 2005 or 2017 — the years before they won wave elections in the midterms. The Democratic lead in those cycles was closer to 7 points. Confused? You haven't seen anything yet. Ipsos' poll actually looks no different from their final poll on the subject in 2024, the year Republicans held on to the House. The Journal poll, which is one of Trump's better ones, shows the Democrats gaining significantly from its final survey in 2024, when Republicans were up by 4 points. But the seat-by-seat landscape in the House isn't the most appealing for Democrats. Both the Cook Political Report and Inside Elections show more potential pickup opportunities for the Republicans than Democrats. This is without any pro-Republican redistricting that might occur in Texas — or potential pro-Democratic redistricting in other states as retaliation for whatever Texas does. Democrats had more pickup chances than Republicans by this point in both 2005 and especially 2017, according to Cook. I should point out, however, that Democrats don't need a wave to take back the House. They need a small gain given the GOP's razor-thin majority. But with a smaller-than-usual lead on the generic ballot for Democrats and potential redistricting, that may not happen. The bottom line All of this leaves me a little befuddled. I believe Trump is more unpopular than not. Given that fact, I believe Republicans are in clear trouble for 2026. I'd probably have said the same thing during the 2022 cycle, when Joe Biden's approval rating was awful heading into those midterms. And while Democrats lost the House that fall, Republicans barely pulled it off. This cycle strikes me as even more confusing. And who can forget the most important variable? It's still 2025. It was only months before the 2022 midterms that Roe v. Wade got overturned and gave Democrats a political shot in the arm. We have a long way to go.
Asharq Al-Awsat
2 days ago
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Abubakr Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Ali Abdullah Saleh Anticipated His Fate at the Hands of the Houthis
Former Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr Al-Qirbi reflected on the unraveling of Yemen's political landscape following 2004, the year that marked the beginning of a complex and eventually fatal relationship between the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthi movement. Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat in the second and final part of an in-depth conversation, Al-Qirbi shares personal insights on the war, Iran's influence, the Arab Spring, and how Yemen's long-time ruler foresaw his tragic end. According to Al-Qirbi, Saleh first began to see the Houthis as a threat around the year 2000, when they started building external alliances, including with Iran and Libya, and shifting from religious activism to overt political mobilization. This culminated in the first armed conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in 2004. Al-Qirbi believes the Houthis' turn toward Iran was a direct consequence of the wars waged against them in Yemen. 'They sought a protector, and they found one in Iran,' he said, noting that Tehran's support came not only from the government but also from religious institutions. He recounted that he personally visited Iran twice to address Yemen's concerns, meeting both President Mohammad Khatami and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 'We stressed three things: Yemenis—Sunnis and Zaydis—had coexisted peacefully for centuries; regional peace depended on non-interference; and Iran needed to stop supporting the Houthis, even indirectly.' Tehran, for its part, assured him of its commitment to Yemen's stability but, Al-Qirbi implied, offered little practical restraint. Talk of Succession Reflecting on the 2006 elections, Al-Qirbi described them as a turning point: 'It was the first time Saleh truly earned his win, receiving 60 percent of the vote in a competitive race.' He insisted the process was largely free and fair, with credible international observers in attendance. These elections, however, intensified internal political strife. There was growing suspicion that Saleh was preparing his son for succession, a rumor that dogged his later years and stirred discontent among Yemenis and international stakeholders alike. The Arab Spring: Shock and Opportunity Yemen, like much of the Arab world, was caught off-guard by the speed and ferocity of the Arab Spring. Al-Qirbi acknowledges that while the regime anticipated regional change - particularly after 9/11 and increased US civil society activity - the spark from Tunisia was unexpected. 'Saleh wasn't surprised by the demands for reform,' Al-Qirbi noted, 'but he questioned the method. His position was that change should come through democratic institutions, not by toppling governments.' During the mass youth sit-ins and growing opposition movements, Al-Qirbi believes Saleh recognized the West's shifting stance. 'He realized that the US and others were now saying plainly: Saleh must go.' Despite this, the president insisted any transition should occur constitutionally, not through force. One of the most poignant moments in the interview comes when Al-Qirbi addresses Saleh's reaction to the downfall of fellow Arab leaders like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. 'It deeply affected him,' Al-Qirbi said. 'These were men he knew personally. Watching them fall, especially so brutally, had a profound impact.' Saleh, according to Al-Qirbi, was aware of the cost of clinging to power. 'He could have crushed the protests with force. He had the means, but he chose not to, fearing the chaos it might unleash.' Ultimately, Saleh agreed to a Gulf-brokered deal to step down in 2011, ushering in Vice President Abed Rabbuh Mansour Hadi as his successor. From Vice President to Rival: The Hadi Transition Al-Qirbi was a strong supporter of Hadi's elevation to the presidency, arguing that his long service as vice president and his lack of overt political ambition made him a natural and unifying choice. But the relationship between the two men quickly deteriorated. 'Saleh began to feel that Hadi was sidelining him from the General People's Congress (GPC),' Al-Qirbi said. 'He felt betrayed, especially when Hadi began appointing his own loyalists to represent the party in the National Dialogue Conference.' This rift widened dramatically as Houthi forces advanced through northern Yemen. While some accused Saleh of allying with the Houthis to settle scores with political rivals, Al-Qirbi disputes this characterization. 'He never truly allied with them. At best, there was a tactical understanding, and even that crumbled once they reached Amran.' Al-Qirbi confirms that Saleh had urged Hadi to stop the Houthi advance before they reached Sana'a, a warning that went unheeded. 'Saleh expected the government to act, but it didn't. That was a pivotal moment.' The Fall of Sana'a and Saleh's Final Days When the Houthis seized Sana'a in 2014, Al-Qirbi was in the city. He recalls the shock that swept through the capital as government forces surrendered without resistance. 'Nobody expected it to happen so easily,' he said. Despite forming a brief partnership with the Houthis, Saleh grew increasingly uneasy. Al-Qirbi recounts how Houthi supervisors effectively controlled ministries, sidelining GPC ministers and eroding Saleh's influence. By 2017, tensions reached a breaking point. As Saleh prepared to commemorate the anniversary of the GPC's founding, Houthi forces viewed the event as a political threat. That same year, they killed him. 'Saleh anticipated it,' Al-Qirbi admits. 'He understood the risks of engaging with the Houthis and sensed early on that they were not true partners.' Al-Qirbi speaks of Saleh with a mix of admiration and reflection. 'He was a flexible leader, willing to engage with enemies, and he preferred dialogue over violence. Had he been a man of force, he could have crushed the protests. But he chose restraint.' Asked whether Saleh's long rule prevented the building of a true Yemeni state, Al-Qirbi acknowledges both internal constraints and missed opportunities. 'There were moments - after reunification, after the 1994 war, and especially after 2006 - where a stronger state could have been built. But like many revolutionary leaders, Saleh became too focused on power and too cautious to make drastic reforms.' On Yemen's famously complex tribal and political fabric, Al-Qirbi supports Saleh's infamous quote likening governance in Yemen to 'dancing on the heads of snakes.' He agrees, 'It's an accurate description. Balancing tribal, regional, political, and external interests is an impossible act.' Hope for Unity? Despite everything, Al-Qirbi remains cautiously optimistic about Yemen's future. 'Yemen must return to unity. Without it, there can be no long-term stability,' he insists. But he warns that foreign interference remains a significant obstacle. 'The day Yemenis are left to negotiate among themselves is the day peace becomes possible.' Asked whether the Houthis could be brought under the authority of a national government, he offers a realist's view: 'There are now three centers of power: Sana'a, Aden, and the internationally recognized government. None are truly sovereign in their decisions. But if dialogue is given a real chance - without outside manipulation - Yemenis will find a solution.'
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
What polls show about a very confusing political landscape
The political landscape right now is more confusing than a corn maze. For every data point that suggests Republicans face headwinds, there seems to be another that suggests Democrats should hold their britches. It all leaves this political analyst wondering just what the heck is going on out there, to paraphrase the great Vince Lombardi. Trump's popularity Let's start with President Donald Trump's approval rating. Gallup released a poll last week putting Trump's approval rating (37%), way down from the beginning of his second term (47%). The poll made a lot of press. Then you have the Wall Street Journal survey, which got a lot less play and showed something very different. Trump's net approval ratings among registered voters (approval - disapproval), while still negative at -6 percentage points, have barely declined from earlier this year. His approval rating of 46% looks a lot like it did at the start of the year. There are even surveys that have Trump's approval rating basically equal to his disapproval rating. Diving deeper into the data can leave one more befuddled, even when looking at the averages. Trump's approval rating with independents is lower than any president at this point in office. Yet he's lost very little ground with Republicans since the beginning of the year. This is important because there are a lot of them (e.g. see the section below this one). The average overall, regardless of how you compute the average, still does have Trump's net approval negative. That's where I think it is. Yet, I can't guarantee it. We've seen too many times in the last decade that the range of the results gave us a better understanding of the potential outcomes than the average did at pinpointing where things would end up. Party identification Pollsters will almost always ask how people identify themselves: Democrat, Republican or independent. Then they'll follow that up by asking independents whether they lean toward the Democratic or Republican side of the aisle. Party identification is one of the fundamental variables to understand how people will vote. Most Democrats will vote for Democratic candidates, while most Republicans will vote for Republican candidates. No wonder a lot of people took note of the Pew Research Center's annual benchmark poll that was released last week that showed 46% of the country were Republican or leaned Republican to 45% who were Democratic or leaned Democratic. That margin is no different from last year's version of the poll, before Trump won the presidency again. Pew's data, however, isn't the only data. I asked Quinnipiac University for their polls conducted during roughly the same period. Quinnipiac shows a pretty clear swing to the Democrats over the course of the year. During the January-to-February period, Republicans (including leaners) held a 1- to 3-point advantage on party affiliation. Democrats, however, were ahead by 2 to 4 points in the April and June polls. This included two 4-point edges in both June surveys they put into the field. I don't know who is right. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Democrats may be slightly ahead, though that's not great on a metric where they have usually been ahead over the years. The generic congressional ballot This question is one of my favorites. It asks respondents some form of 'would you vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate from your district?' The polling does seem to have the Democrats up. The Journal has them up narrowly among registered voters by 3 points. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from June finds the parties about evenly matched, with Democrats at 40% to Republicans' 38%. This is well behind the pace of where Democrats were in either 2005 or 2017 — the years before they won wave elections in the midterms. The Democratic lead in those cycles was closer to 7 points. Confused? You haven't seen anything yet. Ipsos' poll actually looks no different from their final poll on the subject in 2024, the year Republicans held on to the House. The Journal poll, which is one of Trump's better ones, shows the Democrats gaining significantly from its final survey in 2024, when Republicans were up by 4 points. But the seat-by-seat landscape in the House isn't the most appealing for Democrats. Both the Cook Political Report and Inside Elections show more potential pickup opportunities for the Republicans than Democrats. This is without any pro-Republican redistricting that might occur in Texas — or potential pro-Democratic redistricting in other states as retaliation for whatever Texas does. Democrats had more pickup chances than Republicans by this point in both 2005 and especially 2017, according to Cook. I should point out, however, that Democrats don't need a wave to take back the House. They need a small gain given the GOP's razor-thin majority. But with a smaller-than-usual lead on the generic ballot for Democrats and potential redistricting, that may not happen. The bottom line All of this leaves me a little befuddled. I believe Trump is more unpopular than not. Given that fact, I believe Republicans are in clear trouble for 2026. I'd probably have said the same thing during the 2022 cycle, when Joe Biden's approval rating was awful heading into those midterms. And while Democrats lost the House that fall, Republicans barely pulled it off. This cycle strikes me as even more confusing. And who can forget the most important variable? It's still 2025. It was only months before the 2022 midterms that Roe v. Wade got overturned and gave Democrats a political shot in the arm. We have a long way to go.
CNN
2 days ago
- Business
- CNN
What polls show about a very confusing political landscape
The political landscape right now is more confusing than a corn maze. For every data point that suggests Republicans face headwinds, there seems to be another that suggests Democrats should hold their britches. It all leaves this political analyst wondering just what the heck is going on out there, to paraphrase the great Vince Lombardi. Let's start with President Donald Trump's approval rating. Gallup released a poll last week putting Trump's approval rating (37%), way down from the beginning of his second term (47%). The poll made a lot of press. Then you have the Wall Street Journal survey, which got a lot less play and showed something very different. Trump's net approval ratings among registered voters (approval - disapproval), while still negative at -6 percentage points, have barely declined from earlier this year. His approval rating of 46% looks a lot like it did at the start of the year. There are even surveys that have Trump's approval rating basically equal to his disapproval rating. Diving deeper into the data can leave one more befuddled, even when looking at the averages. Trump's approval rating with independents is lower than any president at this point in office. Yet he's lost very little ground with Republicans since the beginning of the year. This is important because there are a lot of them (e.g. see the section below this one). The average overall, regardless of how you compute the average, still does have Trump's net approval negative. That's where I think it is. Yet, I can't guarantee it. We've seen too many times in the last decade that the range of the results gave us a better understanding of the potential outcomes than the average did at pinpointing where things would end up. Pollsters will almost always ask how people identify themselves: Democrat, Republican or independent. Then they'll follow that up by asking independents whether they lean toward the Democratic or Republican side of the aisle. Party identification is one of the fundamental variables to understand how people will vote. Most Democrats will vote for Democratic candidates, while most Republicans will vote for Republican candidates. No wonder a lot of people took note of the Pew Research Center's annual benchmark poll that was released last week that showed 46% of the country were Republican or leaned Republican to 45% who were Democratic or leaned Democratic. That margin is no different from last year's version of the poll, before Trump won the presidency again. Pew's data, however, isn't the only data. I asked Quinnipiac University for their polls conducted during roughly the same period. Quinnipiac shows a pretty clear swing to the Democrats over the course of the year. During the January-to-February period, Republicans (including leaners) held a 1- to 3-point advantage on party affiliation. Democrats, however, were ahead by 2 to 4 points in the April and June polls. This included two 4-point edges in both June surveys they put into the field. I don't know who is right. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Democrats may be slightly ahead, though that's not great on a metric where they have usually been ahead over the years. This question is one of my favorites. It asks respondents some form of 'would you vote for the Democratic or Republican candidate from your district?' The polling does seem to have the Democrats up. The Journal has them up narrowly among registered voters by 3 points. A Reuters/Ipsos poll from June finds the parties about evenly matched, with Democrats at 40% to Republicans' 38%. This is well behind the pace of where Democrats were in either 2005 or 2017 — the years before they won wave elections in the midterms. The Democratic lead in those cycles was closer to 7 points. Confused? You haven't seen anything yet. Ipsos' poll actually looks no different from their final poll on the subject in 2024, the year Republicans held on to the House. The Journal poll, which is one of Trump's better ones, shows the Democrats gaining significantly from its final survey in 2024, when Republicans were up by 4 points. But the seat-by-seat landscape in the House isn't the most appealing for Democrats. Both the Cook Political Report and Inside Elections show more potential pickup opportunities for the Republicans than Democrats. This is without any pro-Republican redistricting that might occur in Texas — or potential pro-Democratic redistricting in other states as retaliation for whatever Texas does. Democrats had more pickup chances than Republicans by this point in both 2005 and especially 2017, according to Cook. I should point out, however, that Democrats don't need a wave to take back the House. They need a small gain given the GOP's razor-thin majority. But with a smaller-than-usual lead on the generic ballot for Democrats and potential redistricting, that may not happen. All of this leaves me a little befuddled. I believe Trump is more unpopular than not. Given that fact, I believe Republicans are in clear trouble for 2026. I'd probably have said the same thing during the 2022 cycle, when Joe Biden's approval rating was awful heading into those midterms. And while Democrats lost the House that fall, Republicans barely pulled it off. This cycle strikes me as even more confusing. And who can forget the most important variable? It's still 2025. It was only months before the 2022 midterms that Roe v. Wade got overturned and gave Democrats a political shot in the arm. We have a long way to go.
